PROVISIONAL PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
1. The amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in relation to step-parent adoption do not appear to be effective. The Commission therefore propose that the New South Wales Government negotiate with the Commonwealth with a view to having them repealed, or rendered inapplicable to New South Wales.
2. The present system of issuing a new birth certificate after adoption should be supplemented by the registration of a separate document, a certificate of adoption, which would include pre-adoption and post-adoption information.
3. The law should continue to reinforce the idea that adoption represents a permanent commitment to the child. Where a less permanent relationship is contemplated, adoption is not the appropriate legal mechanism and orders for custody or guardianship might be more appropriate.
4. Particular effort should be made to ensure that the new legislation is written in “plain English” so that it can be understood by the people it concerns.
5. The provisions of the Adoption Information Act 1990 (NSW) should be incorporated in Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), so that there will be a single Act relating to adoption. The title “Adoption Act 19xx” is preferable, both because it is shorter than the existing title and because, since adoption of adults is provided for, the words “of children” are not strictly correct.
6. The new legislation should reproduce the substance of the offences in the present Act, except those offences that are designed to prevent members of the birth family from interfering with the adoption process or the adoptive family.
7. The adoption legislation should provide, in substance, that the court should be open to the public, but that publication of names and identifying information should be prevented. It would be appropriate, however, for the Act also to provide that the court could exclude individuals or classes of individuals from the whole or part of the proceedings where this was necessary in order to prevent the disclosure of identifying information contrary to the provisions of the Act.
POINTS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION
Should the rules of evidence apply to adoption proceedings?
14.1 This Chapter deals with some technical issues, including the relationship between State and Commonwealth legislative power, and some other matters that do not fall within the previous chapters.
STATE AND FEDERAL ISSUES
14.2 The present Review relates to a New South Wales statute, the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), and the Commission’s Report will be made to the New South Wales Attorney-General. Nevertheless, the review involves consideration of a number of issues relating to existing and potential Commonwealth laws. The New South Wales Parliament cannot alter Commonwealth laws, but it may request the Commonwealth to consider amendments. This chapter deals with these State-Federal issues.
Legislative power in adoption
The present position
14.3 In Australia, legislation on adoption has always been a matter for state and territory laws, not for federal laws. In New South Wales, adoption is governed by the Adoption of Children Act 1965, and jurisdiction is exercised by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. This legislation is based on the general power of the New South Wales Parliament to pass laws for New South Wales. The situation is somewhat complicated, however, by the constitutional division of powers in Australia, and in particular, by the impact of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
14.4 The Commonwealth Parliament does not have a general power to make laws. It can make laws only where there is express power to do so under the Commonwealth Constitution. There is no express constitutional power for the Commonwealth to make laws on the subject of adoption. There is some scope, however, for the Commonwealth to make laws which would have an impact on adoption. For example, it might well be possible for the Commonwealth, under its constitutional power to make laws relating to marriage,1 to pass legislation dealing with the adoption of children of a marriage, or adoption by married persons. Again, it might be possible for the Commonwealth to make laws about the adoption of Aboriginal children under its powers relating to “the people of any race”,2 or (using the external affairs power3) laws which implement the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Australia ratified in 1990. The Commonwealth has not in fact passed any such laws. It has, however, amended the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in a way that affects the operation of the New South Wales adoption laws in relation to step-parent adoptions. Before considering those provisions, it is necessary to say something about the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Family Court of Australia.
The Family Court of Australia
14.5 The Family Court of Australia was created in 1976 with the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).4 Initially it dealt with custody, guardianship and access matters only when they involved children of marriages. In 1988, New South Wales, together with three other states,5 referred certain power over ex-nuptial children to the Commonwealth and the Act was amended to deal with all children, regardless of the marital status of their parents. These “referred powers” related to child maintenance, and questions of child guardianship, custody and access. They did not include adoption.
14.6 In 1989, there was a further change. Jurisdictional difficulties between the states and the Commonwealth were eased by the introduction of “cross-vesting” jurisdiction.6 This legislation gave the Supreme Court power to exercise jurisdiction of the Family Court, and gave the Family Court power to exercise jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It also contained provisions allowing the courts to transfer matters, so that the courts could ensure that each Court would normally continue to exercise jurisdiction in the ordinary way. In general, adoption matters continued to be heard by the Supreme Court and custody, guardianship and access matters continued to be heard by the Family Court. This legislation has proved particularly effective where the proceedings involve several matters, some arising under Commonwealth law and some under State law. The cross-vesting scheme enables one court to deal with all the matters.
14.7 The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) deals with such matters as guardianship, custody and access, but does not create a jurisdiction over adoption. Indeed, it contains a provision, s 60H, to the effect that the Act does not interfere with the exercise by state courts and authorities of their powers under child welfare and adoption legislation. It is clear that the legislation contemplates that matters of guardianship, custody and access will be dealt with under the Family Law Act, while matters of adoption will continue to be dealt with under State law, and this is essentially how the legislation operates in practice.
14.8 Although it cannot exercise jurisdiction in adoption, the Family Court can exercise its jurisdiction in guardianship, custody and access over all children whether or not they have been adopted. The Act provides, in effect, that any person can apply for an order relating to guardianship, custody or access in respect of any child.7 It is possible, for example, for the Family Court to make an access order in favour of a birth parent after the New South Wales Supreme Court has made an adoption order in relation to the child.8 Similarly, the Family Court could make orders relating to the custody and guardianship of adopted children, even if those orders gave rights to birth parents. Whether the Family Court would do so would depend on whether in the circumstances of each case, it considered that such an order would promote the welfare of the child. For this reason, it is not correct to assume that adoption is necessarily final in determining who has guardianship and custody of a child. Adoption orders are “final” in the sense that it is very difficult to revoke them. But they lack “finality” in that it is always possible for someone to apply to the Family Court for an order relating to guardianship, custody or access, even after the child has been adopted. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the Family Court would make such an order in favour of birth relatives only in unusual circumstances, and applications for custody and guardianship by members of an adopted child’s birth family appear to be rare.
A reference of power?
14.9 The question whether adoption should also be referred to the Commonwealth, or should be transferred to the Commonwealth by constitutional amendment, has been considered from time to time. There are a number of arguments in favour of such a step. First, especially since the 1988 reference of power, the Family Court of Australia is now the specialist family court in Australia, and it would be appropriate that it should deal with adoption.9 Second, it may be argued that uniformity is desirable, and that experience shows that lasting uniformity will not be achieved except through Commonwealth legislation. Third, it might be suggested that the independent work of the various states and territories in reviewing their legislation is highly inefficient, and it would be better to concentrate reform energies on the creation and revision of a single national adoption law. Finally, Commonwealth responsibility might be regarded as appropriate in light of the close links between immigration and inter-country adoption and the increasing importance of national legal obligations created by such international instruments as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Hague Convention.
14.10 In the Commission’s view these are formidable arguments. Obviously, if such a reference were to be considered, thought would have to be given to the relationship between the legislation and the delivery of services in adoption, now in the hands of the Department of Community Services and private agencies. One possibility might be that licensing of agencies and delivery of adoption services would remain a matter for the State, the main change being the transfer of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to the Family Court of Australia. Given the close links between adoption and the State’s role in the provision of services for children in need of care, this would appear to be the most practicable arrangement. The Commission is presently inclined to recommend that the New South Wales Government give consideration to a possible reference of power over adoption, and that it should discuss this matter with representatives of other states and of the Commonwealth.
The Family Law Act and step-parent adoptions
14.11 The issues arising in step-parent adoptions are considered in Chapter 4. As noted there, it is widely felt that adoption is often used inappropriately in step-parent situations. This view no doubt explains some rather complex amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which require consideration here.10 The general effect of these provisions is that before an application can be made for a step-parent adoption, consent should be obtained from the Family Court. However, perhaps due to constitutional limitations on the Commonwealth’s power, the Act’s provisions do not actually prevent such applications being made. Instead, they provide in effect that such adoptions, when made without the Family Court’s leave, do not succeed in transferring custody and guardianship to the step-parent (although they do have the other effects of adoption). The cross-vesting legislation has complicated the matter further, raising the possibility either that the Family Court, having granted leave, might go on to deal with the adoption application, or that the Supreme Court might itself grant leave, using jurisdiction cross-vested from the Family Court - although an amendment appears to close off this possibility.11 Commentators have drawn attention to the complexity of these provisions and the apparent confusion they might cause, and have doubted whether they address the main issue, namely the appropriateness of step-parent adoption.12
14.12 The Commission’s provisional recommendations on step-parent adoption, detailed in Chapter 4, are designed to ensure that the suitability of step-parent adoption is carefully considered at the preliminary hearing. The guidelines that will govern adoption, while not forbidding step-parent adoption or limiting it to particular situations, will draw attention to the factors governing its suitability in particular situations. It is hoped that the procedures recommended will help to ensure that these matters are carefully considered. In the Commission’s view, these recommendations would deal adequately with the issues arising in step-parent adoption, and in any case, the amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) do not appear to be effective. Our present inclination is to recommend that the New South Wales Government negotiate with the Commonwealth with a view to having them repealed, or rendered inapplicable to New South Wales.
BIRTH CERTIFICATES OF ADOPTED PERSONS
14.13 The form of birth certificates of adopted people was discussed in many submissions, and was the subject of considerable diversity of views.
The present law
14.14 The present law and practice may be summarised as follows. When a person is adopted the order for adoption is transmitted to the Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages, and that office prepares a new birth certificate, known as an “amended” certificate. The amended certificate is indistinguishable from the birth certificate of people who have not been adopted.13 The amended certificate gives the child’s name as determined in the order of adoption, and the true date and place of birth. It sets out details of the names, occupations, ages and places of birth of the adoptive parents under the categories of “mother” and father”. It sets out the date and place of the adoptive parents’ marriage. It also lists, under the category “previous children of relationship”, any children of the adoptive parents who were born before the date of birth of the adopted person.
14.15 The original birth certificate, which normally includes the name of the birth mother and sometimes the birth father, is not destroyed. It is not generally released by the Registry except under the provisions of the Adoption Information Act 1990 (NSW), by which the adopted person is entitled to the original birth certificate upon reaching that age of 18 years. When the original birth certificate is provided under the Adoption Information Act 1990 (NSW), it bears a certification in the following terms: “Superseded by a later record and issued under Adoption Information Act 1990. Not for Official Use.” The original birth certificate is thus not available for official use by the adopted person, for example in obtaining a passport.
Issues and options
14.16 Clearly having access to the original birth certificate has meant a great deal to adoptees, and the Commission’s recent review of the 1990 Act indicates that this right should continue.14 However, it has been submitted that the continued use of the amended certificate is objectionable because it misrepresents the truth about the adoptee’s life.
14.17 Evidence to the Commission indicates that adoptees have different needs in relation to the birth certificate. Some are content with the present situation. They appreciate the right to have the original birth certificate. They are happy to use the amended birth certificate, and pleased that in its present form it does not normally reveal their adoptive status. They take the view that they should have the right whether or not to disclose to people that they are adopted. As stated in the New South Wales Committee on Adoption Submission:
The current system, although perpetuating undesirable secrecy, does give privacy. Schools and sporting organisations apparently require the sighting of a full birth certificate at the time of registration of a student/player deeming extracts to be inadequate.15
14.18 Other adoptees, however, would like to be able to use their original birth certificate for official purposes. Even though the present form of birth certificate does not disclose the fact that the person has been adopted, the information in particular cases may suggest this, or at least appear puzzling. For example, if the adopted person was born in another State, or another country, which the adopting parents had never visited, people who did not know of the adoption might seek an explanation of the stated place of birth.
What should be done?
14.19 In the Commission’s view, there is much to be said for a form of birth registration in which the documentation is an accurate record of certain key events, such as birth, change of name, adoption and marriage. On this approach, there would not be a need for a separate birth certificate to issue upon adoption. While the Commission draws attention to this as a possible long-term reform of the system of registration, it recognises that the implementation of such a change would be an enormous task, that much of the relevant information is not now available, and that the privacy aspects of such a change would require careful consideration. Further, it is sufficient in the present context to focus on recommendations relating only to adoption.
14.20 Turning to options that might realistically be considered in the short and medium term, one possibility would be for the law to be flexible, perhaps by providing that some categories of adoption should not involve the issuing of a new birth certificate, or alternatively by providing that the court may determine in each case whether it is appropriate for a new birth certificate to be issued.16 The Commission’s tentative view is that such an approach may prove unduly complex, and might suggest a distinction between two categories of adoption. On the whole, it would be attracted by such a proposal only if satisfied that it is impossible to find a satisfactory approach which would apply to all adoptions.
14.21 In this respect, the options appear to be as follows:
i Retain the present system. For the reasons given above, this is not entirely satisfactory, as the existing certificate is misleading and incomplete, and causes distress.
ii Supplement the present system by registering a separate document, a certificate of adoption, which would include pre-adoption and post-adoption information. Such a document would set out the child’s original birth details, and also the date and place of the adoption, the names given to the child on adoption, and the names, occupations and address of the adoptive parents. The question of access to this document would need consideration. It could be governed by principles similar to those of the Adoption Information Act 1990 (NSW). On attaining the age of 18, the adopted person would have a right to obtain access to the document. While the child was under 18, the law could provide that it would be accessible to the adoptive parents, and perhaps, to the adopted child with the consent of the adoptive parents or an order of the court. This is the Commission’s preferred option
iii Remove the obstacles to adoptees using their original birth certificate, so that in any situation they would be able to choose which certificate to use. This might, however, cause confusion or even provide occasion for deception. A possible variant, intended to meet this difficulty, could be to require the adoptee to elect which birth certificate to use; the other certificate could then be marked so it could not be used. These approaches, however, would entail a less than complete picture; choice of the original birth certificate would conceal the important fact of adoption, and choice of the amended certificate would continue the present difficulties.
iv Combine the birth information and adoption information so that adoptees would have only one birth certificate, which would contain both birth and adoption details. This approach would create a truthful and complete record. On the other hand it would mean that adoptees would have to disclose their adoptive status whenever they used the birth certificate. Some would see this as an invasion of their privacy. Some would also oppose this approach on the ground that they would not want a form of birth certificate that was different from that of non-adopted people.
The Western Australian Review favoured a version of this approach.17 It recommended “issuing only one birth certificate which records details of both birth and adoptive parents, the date of the adoption and the name by which the adoptee will be known”.18 Access to the birth certificate by any of the parties would not normally be restricted. However, in order to allow people to avoid displaying the fact of the adoption unnecessarily, it recommended that there should be available to the adoptee and/or the adoptive parents on request “a certified copy of the Registration of Birth which does not include reference to the birth parents or adoptive status”. This could be treated as a full birth certificate. This however does not appear to be a solution in cases where the full certificate is required. It is already possible in New South Wales to obtain a summary birth certificate, but this is not accepted for all purposes. In the Commission’s view, therefore, the Western Australian proposal does not satisfactorily deal with the problem of disclosure of the person’s adoptive status.
v Provide that no new birth certificate should be issued upon the making of the adoption order. The original birth certificate would remain in force unamended. There could be, however, an additional registration of the adoption, showing the adopted person’s pre-adoption and post-adoption identities. It could be argued that this approach would provide a truthful record of the child’s birth. However, in the ordinary case where the adopted person used the surname given on adoption, he or she would need to produce the adoption record as well as the original birth certificate when applying, for example, for a passport. Such a system would require the adopted person, or the adoptive parents when the child is young, to produce two documents rather than one, and to disclose the fact of adoption. It is the Commission’s impression that relatively few adopted people would wish to have such a system.
Conclusions
14.22 The Commission’s tentative view is to favour proposal (ii). This would appear to meet the needs of most adopted people. It is true that it would not completely remove the misleading nature of the birth certificate, which would continue to give the impression that the child was born to the adopting parents. However, the certificate would express the important legal truth that the parental rights and responsibilities had been transferred to the adoptive parents, and the child had been accepted as a member of their family.
14.23 It might perhaps be said that birth certificates, identifying people as “father” and “mother” should be read as referring to social and legal parenthood where this does not coincide with birth parenthood. If that view is taken, then the amended birth certificate of an adopted person may not necessarily be seen as misleading. In this connection, it may be pointed out that at least in one other respect birth certificates are not purely records of the actual circumstances at the time of the birth. If a person can satisfy the Registry that he or she has been using a different surname for at least 12 months, it is possible to obtain a substitute birth certificate showing the new surname.19 Comments on this difficult issue will be especially welcomed.
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
14.254 In this section we discuss briefly a number of other matters which are included in the review, and will be dealt with in the final Report, but which are of lesser importance or which have received relatively little comment in submissions.
Discharge of adoption orders
14.25 Discharge of adoption orders should continue to be rare. If difficulties arise, for example where the adoptive parents are separated by death or divorce, or where the child is neglected, the ordinary law should apply. Custody and guardianship matters will be dealt with under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and welfare applications under the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987 (NSW). The purpose of adoption is to relocate the child in a new permanent family, and broadly speaking this should be final. The law should continue to reinforce the idea that adoption represents a permanent commitment to the child. Where a less permanent relationship is contemplated, adoption is not the appropriate legal mechanism and orders for custody or guardianship might be more appropriate. The existing provisions of s 25(1) of the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), which make discharge of adoption orders difficult but possible in limited circumstances, appear to be satisfactory.
Complexities in the present legislation
14.26 In the Commission’s view, the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW) is drafted in a complex and convoluted way, and on many points requires intense concentration and persistence on the part of the reader before its meaning is clear.
14.27 Some examples may be given. In the very important section 21, the structure is so complex that it extends to five levels of heading: 21(1)(c)(i)(a). At many points, there are cross-references that send the reader on a chase through the Act while trying to remember the complex sentence in the original provision. For example, on the relatively simple matter of sending notice to people that an adoption application has been made, the reader starts with s 22, then has to turn to s 26 to learn who is referred to in para (a) of sub-s (1), and then has to take account of a proviso that notice does not have to be given to:
14.28 In the Commission’s view, most if not all of the complexity reflects outdated styles of drafting, and the accretion of amendments over the years. It does not reflect complexity in the subject matter. In the Commission’s view, it should not be difficult to write the new adoption legislation in terms that are easy to understand. Clarity is particularly important in this legislation, since it needs to provide guidance to the individuals and families involved, and to those engaged professionally in adoption work, as well as to lawyers and the court. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to recommend that particular effort be made to ensure that the new legislation is written in “plain English” so that it can be understood by the people it concerns.
14.29 The Commission also proposes that the provisions of the Adoption Information Act 1990 (NSW) be incorporated in the legislation, so that there will be a single Act relating to adoption. We are inclined to prefer the title “Adoption Act 19xx”, both because it is shorter than the existing title and because, since adoption of adults is provided for, the words “of children” are not strictly correct. We note that the shorter title has been used recently in some Australian jurisdictions.20
Adoption of adults
14.30 The present law allows the adoption of adults in limited circumstances. The Commission is inclined to retain this power for use in exceptional cases.
Offences
14.31 The Act includes a set of offences. Some are associated with the regulation of adoption and the banning of privately arranged adoptions. Thus, it is an offence to make private arrangements for adoption, or to advertise for adoption.21 A second group comprises offences designed to protect the adoption process itself. These offences are impersonation of a person whose consent is required,22 making false statements in connection with proposed adoptions,23 using force or duress to influence the parties in making decisions,24 breaching the requirements relating to confidentiality,25 and witnessing a consent to adoption without taking the required steps to ensure, for example, that the person understands the nature of the consent.26
14.32 A third group of offences are designed to prevent members of the birth family from interfering with the adoption process or the adoptive family. These provisions make it an offence for a birth parent to attempt to take the child away from the adopters, or to communicate with the child without the adopters’ consent.27 A related provision, which may not create a criminal offence, is that in certain circumstances unmarried fathers “may not” do anything inconsistent with the making of an adoption order.28
14.33 The Commission’s tentative view is that the new legislation should reproduce the substance of the offences in the first two categories, but not the third. The general law of harassment has been considerably developed by legislation in recent years, and it would seem that any attempts by birth parents or others to contact adopted children could be dealt with adequately under the general law. The behaviour prohibited by the New South Wales Act fails to take account of a person’s right to approach the Family Court for orders as to access. In addition, as the New South Wales Committee on Adoption’s submission pointed out,29 some of the language in the third group of offences is stigmatising and offensive, and inconsistent with present day attitudes and practice in adoption.
A closed court?
14.34 The present Act provides that the court is closed to the public when hearing adoption matters. The question whether courts should be closed in children’s matters has been much debated in recent times. A closed court has been seen as protecting the privacy of the families involved, but constitutes a violation of the well-established principle that justice should not be carried on behind closed doors. The debate has been most developed in connection with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). That Act provides, in substance, that the court should be open to the public, but that publication of names and identifying information should be prevented.30 The Commission is inclined to think that this approach should be followed in relation to adoption. It would be appropriate, however, for the Act also to provide that the court could exclude individuals or classes of individuals from the whole or part of the proceedings where this was necessary in order to prevent the disclosure of identifying information contrary to the provisions of the Act.
Should the rules of evidence apply to adoption proceedings?
14.35 The present Act renders the rules of evidence inapplicable to adoption proceedings. There has been little or no debate about the value of the rules of evidence in adoption proceedings, and the Commission has received no submissions on the question.
14.36 It is difficult to justify the present provision on the ground of a general dissatisfaction with the law of evidence, since this would suggest that the rules of evidence should be dispensed with altogether. The justification for s 65 must be that the rules of evidence are unsuitable for adoption. However, it is not obvious why this should be. In contested matters, for example, it does not seem obvious that the law of evidence is inappropriate. On the other hand, there is a tendency for the law of evidence to be excluded in children’s matters. For example, there is a similar provision in the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1987 (NSW), but not in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), even in relation to custody and access matters. There is nothing in the Family Law Act to support the view that the rules of evidence do not apply to children’s cases, although a number of provisions modify their application and some recent decisions of the Family Court suggest that the rules of evidence do not necessarily apply when their operation would be inconsistent with the principle that the child’s welfare is paramount.
14.38 It may be that in practice, if adoption jurisdiction is to remain in the Supreme Court, the question will be of little practical importance. This is because, first, it seems that in civil cases generally, and children’s cases in particular, the rules are applied rather flexibly, and second, it is likely that even if the rules were not strictly applicable, they would remain very influential in the way the Court exercised the jurisdiction. The Commission would welcome comment on this matter.
FOOTNOTES
1. Constitution, s 51 (xxi).
2. Constitution, s 51 (xxvi).
3. Constitution, s 51 (xxix).
4. Prior to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 had governed custody and guardianship matters arising in the context of divorce. Jurisdiction under this federal act was exercised by the New South Wales Supreme Court.
5. Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania. Queensland followed in 1990. Western Australia did not refer power, but has achieved somewhat similar results through its own legislation, and the establishment of the Family Court of Western Australia.
6. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth); Jurisdiction of Courts(Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (NSW).
7. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 63C.
8. See In the Marriage of Mole and Newling (1987) 11 Fam LR 974.
9. See J Fogarty, K Sanders and M Webster, A Review of the Inter-country Adoption Service in Victoria (Family and Children’s Services Council, Melbourne, October 1989).
10. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60AA and 63F(4).
11. Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 1992(Cth), amending the definition of “special federal matters” in the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth).
12. O Jessep and R Chisholm “Step-parent adoptions and the Family Law Act” (1992) 6(2) Australian Journal of Family Law at 179-187; Fogwell and Ashton (1993) 17 Fam LR 94.
13. Until early 1993, it was possible for some people to identify amended birth certificates because the certificates were numbered in a particular way or certain categories of information were omitted from the certificate. The Commission has been advised that the Department is in the process of revising and re-issuing birth certificates so that they will cease to disclose the fact that the child has been adopted.
14. New South Wales. Law Reform Commission Review of the Adoption Information Act 1990 (NSW) (Report 69, 1992).
15. New South Wales Committee on Adoption, Submission (9 September, 1993) at 3.17.
16. New South Wales Committee on Adoption, Submission (9 September, 1993).
17. Western Australia. Adoption Legislative Review Committee Final Report: A New Approach to Adoption (February 1991).
18. Western Australia. Adoption Legislative Review Committee Final Report: A New Approach to Adoption (February 1991) at para 3.34.
19. There is, however, an annotation on the new certificate linking the person with the original name, to ensure that the process does not entail confusion of records, and, for example, to enable the person to apply for a second passport using the new birth certificate.
20. For example, South Australian and Victoria.
21. Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), s 50-52.
22. Section 55.
23. Section 54.
24. Section 57.
25. Section 53.
26. Section 58.
27. Sections 49 and 50.
28. Section 31D.
29. New South Wales Committee on Adoption, Submission ( 9 September, 1993) at 38.
30. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 121. See generally Australia. Parliament. Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law Act The Family Law Act 1975: Aspects of its Operation and Interpretation (1992) at 347-356.
